Georgetown Center for the Constitution

The House of Representatives. shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Related Citations

Stephen B. Presser, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Fully Revised Second Edition Art. 1 (David F. Forte, and Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014).

Noting that House impeachment is a check on executive abuse independent of any ultimate Senate conviction.

Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 87–97 (2012).

Surveying founding history of the Impeachment Clause and arguing that the Constitution’s impeachment framework broke from English tradition in embracing more purely political accountability for actual misconduct.

Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 347 (2010).

Arguing that presidential impeachment serves to “tame” an impulse toward the assassination of egregiously lawless executives, and that this connection sheds light on the meaning of “High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 25–31 (2009).

Discussing the Samuel Chase impeachment and surveying the history of impeachment in the founding period.

Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove A Federal Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72 (2006).

Discussing the expansion of legislative power reflected by the impeachment provisions and noting that even if other means of removing executive officers exist, the Impeachment Clause was necessary to vest in Congress the executive power to indict, prosecute, and try executive officers.

Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021, 1035-36 (2006).

Discussing founding era arguments with regard to whether the “Decision of 1789” recognized a presidential removal power, and rejecting the contention that the explicit provision for removal in the Impeachment Clause foreclosed a power in the president.

John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703 (2002).

Discussing the rationale for a supermajoritarian impeachment conviction rule, noting that “convicting wrongly on impeachment is more dangerous to the republic than mistakenly failing to convict because wrongful convictions could threaten the independence of the President and judiciary and lead to partisan, destabilizing cycles of reprisals.”

Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 13 (2001).

Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process (2d ed. 2000).

Gary L. McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of the Founders, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 626 (1999).

Noting that “[t]he primary way in which the Founders sought to tame the unruly political passions that an impeachment would likely unleash was to divide the process between the two great houses of the legislature, so that as the House was given the sole power to impeach, the Senate was given ‘the sole Power to try all Impeachments.’”

Jonathan Turley, Congress As Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 735, 773 (1999).

Describing the House impeachment (as opposed to Senate conviction) process as a deterrent to presidential wrongdoing and arguing that “[b]y articulating the grounds for impeachment, the House reaffirms the principle of governance by consent–a principle zealously grounded during the colonial period and expressly guaranteed in the constitutional period.”

Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 Duke L.J. 1 (1999).

Distinguishing function of House impeachment power—a check and deterrent on presidential misconduct, and the Senate trial of impeachment—a Madisonian mechanism for resolving factional disputes.

Jay S. Bybee, Who Executes the Executioner? Impeachment, Indictment and Other Alternatives to Assassination, 2 NEXUS 53 (1997).

Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 596–97 (1994).

Arguing that the Impeachment Clauses do not cabin the dismissal of inferior executive officers in light of the Constitution’s omission of “good behavior” tenure for such officers.

Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 Duke L.J. 231, 246 (1994).

Arguing that “the relevant constitutional text, structure, and history do not support judicial review of the procedural aspects of the constitutionally recognized process for judicial removal.”

Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1989).

Surveying the impeachment literature; finding that literature lacking; and making recommendations based on history, constitutional structure, and respect for the political nature of impeachment.

Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707 (1988).

Reviewing the founding history of impeachment and its implications for sanctions, the standard of proof, impeachable offenses, and judicial review.

Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (1974).

Discussing, inter alia, impeachable offenses and whether impeachment must precede criminal indictment.